Differential Privacy (DP) provides strong guarantees on the risk of compromising a users data in statistical learning applications, though these strong protections make learning challenging and may be too stringent for some use cases. To address this, we propose element level differential privacy, which extends differential privacy to provide protection against leaking information about any particular "element" a user has, allowing better utility and more robust results than classical DP. By carefully choosing these "elements," it is possible to provide privacy protections at a desired granularity. We provide definitions, associated privacy guarantees, and analysis to identify the tradeoffs with the new definition; we also develop several private estimation and learning methodologies, providing careful examples for item frequency and M-estimation (empirical risk minimization) with concomitant privacy and utility analysis. We complement our theoretical and methodological advances with several real-world applications, estimating histograms and fitting several large-scale prediction models, including deep networks. * Part of this work performed while in a summer internship at Apple. Partially supported by the Office of Naval
Introduction
The substantial growth in data collection across many domains has led to commensurate attention to and work on privacy risks in both academic [28, 25] and industrial settings [30, 3, 11] . Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith's differential privacy [28] and its variants [27, 12, 40, 18] -where a randomized algorithm returns similar outputs for similar input samples-is now the standard privacy methodology, as it gives provable protection against strong adversarial attacks on privacy. Indeed, given the output of a differentially private analysis on a sample S = {X 1 , . . . , X n }, it is challenging to identify whether a particular individual x belongs to S even for an attacker knowing the entire sample except for a single observation. These strong guarantees motivate work on private data analyses, including in statistical estimation [46, 23] , machine learning [14] , game theory [39] , and networks and graphs [33, 34] .
Yet developing private algorithms that achieve reasonable utility is challenging, as the strong protections differential privacy provides necessarily degrade statistical utility. On the theoretical side, the relative sample size necessary for private algorithms to achieve similar utility to that of non-private algorithms grows with problem dimension and inversely with the privacy parameter ε [8, 47, 23, 20] . On a practical level, this challenge may lead privacy applications to instantiate a large privacy parameter ε to obtain acceptable statistical performance-for example, Abadi et al. [1] remarkably are able to fit neural networks with differential privacy at all, though they require a value of ε = 8 even for a weaker form of "event level" privacy to achieve performance approaching non-private algorithms-but privacy guarantees for large values are unclear [25] .
We argue that standard differential privacy's strong protections are not always necessary to provide sufficient protection for a system's users. For example, an individual phone user sends multiple text messages, or takes several cell-phone photos, each a single datum. In such cases, it may be satisfying from a privacy perspective not to protect whether a user participates in a dataset-versions of differential privacy protect against discovering this participation, though whether one has a phone is likely not very sensitive-but to protect so that no one knows any particular thing a user has done, e.g., whether the user has ever typed a given word or taken a photo of a mountain. Concretely, consider estimating the frequency of different word use in email messages. Differential privacy prevents an attacker from (accurately) distinguishing a user who sends hundreds of emails daily from one who has never typed a word in his or her lifetime, a protection that may be too strong. More nuanced tradeoffs can arise if we wish to prevent an attacker from knowing, for example, whether a user has ever typed a given word.
To address these challenges, we propose element-level differential privacy, which aims to provide protection for what we-at the risk of some hubristic excess-might term reasonable attacks. The motivation for our definition is that in many statistical estimation and learning problems, an individual may contribute many datapoints; in a problem of learning from mobile devices, a typical cell-phone contains many individual photos and hundreds of distinct text messages, for example, and it is these data that are private. The key to differential privacy and its descendant definitions is the notion of neighboring datasets [25] or samples, where privacy guarantees certify that an adversary given the output of a private mechanism M cannot reliably distinguish between its applications M(x) and M(x ) on neighboring samples x and x . In differential privacy, two samples are neighboring if they differ in at most a single observation. As Chatzikokolakis et al. [13] note, it is thus natural to quantify a distance between users or samples x, x to redefine neighboring, and mechanisms then provide privacy for nearby users under this distance [13, 2, 8] . Figure 1 . Example histories of four different users' text messages (each column represents a user's conversation). The left three columns reflect a conversation of the first author with his friends. The rightmost is a conversation between the second and third authors. In the standard differential privacy definition, each user is distance 1 from each other user. In contrast, element-level privacy (with the histogram distance function described in the introduction) identifies the three left transcripts as neighboring-at distance 2-irrespective of the number of times each uses the word yo or bro, while the right conversation is distant.
Element-level privacy takes this idea and defines distances based on the elements, which we describe in the sequel, that an individual user's data x contains; here, two users are neighboring if they differ in one or fewer elements. Consider estimating frequency of word use in text (SMS) messages. Then a possible distance function between two users is the number of words that have different counts per user, i.e., we represent each user as a vector x ∈ N d of per-word counts (how many times the user used each word in a dictionary of size d), and the distance between users is the Hamming distance d(x, x ) = d j=1 1{x j = x j } between their histograms (see Figure 1 ). Elementlevel differential privacy then makes it challenging for an attacker to discover any particular word a user utters. In Section 2.2 and throughout our applications, we present more concrete examples to compare and contrast element-level and classical differential privacy.
As we note above, there is substantial work on privacy broadly, with a line of work investigating appropriate notions of distance and what distinctions between individuals and data should be protected. We highlight a few works in this direction here. Andrés et al. [2] develop distance-based notions of privacy to release information to geo-location services, where privacy protections may degrade with distance to a user (e.g., it is acceptable to release that a user is in Paris, but perhaps not at 28 Rue Vieille du Temple). Kasiviswanathan et al. [33] discuss protecting privacy at the level of node differences in graphs, where two graphs are neighboring if a single node is removed or added to the graph (with arbitrarily many edges to other nodes), which is distinct from providing privacy only on edge appearances. In the context of large-scale web or mobile applications, there are differences between event-level privacy [29, 30, 1] , which protects each individual action a user takes, though a user contributing multiple data items (e.g. sending multiple text messages) suffers linear degradation in privacy guarantees, and user-level privacy [38] , where all users are neighboring, no matter how many data contributions they make or how diverse their data. The former (event-level) provides limited privacy guarantees, while the latter (user-level) may be too strong for practical use. In this context, element-level privacy attempts to provide privacy at the right granularity for the application at hand: in a way we formalize shortly, one identifies the elements to be protected, then guarantees that no matter how much data corresponding to a particular element a user contributes, the output of the privacy mechanism changes little.
In the remainder of the paper, we carefully define element-level differential privacy (Section 2), using standard tools to show that it inherits many of the desiderata important for satisfactory privacy definitions (composition, group privacy, privacy to post-processing, side-information resilience, and amplification by subsampling) in Section 2.3. As one of our major goals is to provide practicable procedures for estimation and learning with privacy protections, we devote Section 3 to several methodological contributions. In particular, we demonstrate histogram estimators and tools for estimation of frequent elements, highlighting the advantages element-level privacy can provide, and we show how to apply element-level privacy to fit large scale machine learning models and compute M-estimators (Section 3.3) using stochastic-gradient-type methods. Along the way, we demonstrate a new asymptotic normality result for stochastic approximation procedures applied to fixed finite datasets, which may be of interest beyond privacy. We complement these with experimental evidence on several real-world machine-learning tasks in Section 4.
Element-level privacy
As we allude in the introduction, our main goal in this paper is to provide a new definition of privacy, simultaneously developing its properties while demonstrating new procedures that obey its strictures. To that end, we begin by defining element-level privacy, contrasting it with prior notions. The basic notion of privacy is Dwork et al.'s differential privacy (DP), while other definitions of privacy, of which we recapitulate a few, include approximate differential privacy [27] , Rényi differential privacy [40] and concentrated differential privacy [26, 12] , and f -differential privacy [18] .
Privacy definitions
The key to each of these definitions of privacy is a distance on the space of samples. In particular, let d sample : X n × X n → R + be a distance on X n , and let M be a randomized mapping from X n to some (measurable) space Z. In standard differential privacy, this distance is the (orderinvariant) Hamming metric: letting Π n be the collection of all permutations of n elements, for samples S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ), S = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X n we have
As Chatzikokolakis et al. [13] note, focusing on the case of differential privacy, we may take any distance on the samples to provide analogues of differential privacy; such alternative distances are important, for example, for graph-based notions of differential privacy [33] , location services [2] , or event-level streams [29, 30] .
We thus make the following definitions, which generalize those in prior work by treating distance between two samples as a first-class object.
Definition 2.1 (Dwork et al. [28, 27] ). Let ε, δ ≥ 0. The randomized mechanism M : X n → Z is (ε, δ)-differentially private for the distance d sample if for any pair of samples S, S with d sample (S, S ) ≤ 1 and any measurable subset A ⊂ Z,
where the probability is taken over only the randomness in M (treating S, S as fixed).
We can abstract away from other definitions of privacy as well.
Definition 2.2 (Mironov [40] ). Let ε ≥ 0, α ≥ 1. The mechanism M : X n → Z is (ε, α)-Rényi differentially private for the distance d sample if for any pair of samples S, S with d sample (S, S ) ≤ 1,
Mironov [40] shows that any (ε, α)-Rényi private mechanism is also (ε + log 1 δ α−1 , δ)-differential private for all δ ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence, if we wish to compute and release f (S) for some S ∈ X n , and f (S) − f (S ) 2 ≤ ρ for any neighboring samples S, S , then the Gaussian mechanism
provides (ε, δ)-differential privacy for all ε > 0. For ε ≤ 1, the 1/ε term in the normal variance is unnecessary [27] . (See Appendix A for this calculation.) Rather than exhaustively discussing alternative privacy definitions, we note that each variant of differential privacy (f -differential privacy [18] or concentrated differential privacy [26, 12] ) similarly rely on sample distances, saying that a mechanism M(·) is private if its output distribution changes little (under an appropriate metric) when its input sample changes.
Element-level privacy definition
The standard distance in each privacy definition is the Hamming distance between samples S, S ; this is satisfying, as it limits any inferences that can be made about an individual [28, 24] . In some scenarios, this definition makes learning challenging (or, depending on the task and desired privacy guarantee, essentially impossible) [23, 20] . It is thus natural to consider more fine-grained distance notions to allow utility while providing sufficient privacy. For our purposes, it is useful to consider a scenario frequent in large-scale learning applications, such as federated learning (e.g. [1] ), where individual users contribute multiple data items rather than a single item. In such cases, we protect a user so that no one knows any particular thing the user has done. For example, a student with a phone sends many text messages, but may wish that his parents and teachers never know whether he has ever sent a curse word, irrespective of the number of times he may or may not have sent one.
To formalize this, we introduce element-level privacy. A sample or dataset S consists of n user's data (or data units) S = {x (u) } n u=1 , while each user u maintains local data of size m(u), where the size may depend on the user
For example, individual u's data may consist of the m(u) photos she has taken. External to the users are K clusters {c 1 , . . . , c K } partitioning X , where we view the cluster centroids as the elements to be made private, and each datapoint x (u) i belongs to precisely one cluster c k (i.e. has a nearest element); we denote this by x (u) i ∈ c k . The distance between two users' local data x = {x 1 , . . . , x n } and x = {x 1 , . . . , x m } is then the number of clusters c 1 , . . . , c K with different memberships for the two users' data, that is,
where {x i : x i ∈ c k } are implicitly multi-sets. Then two users' data x, x are element-neighbors if d user (x, x ) ≤ 1; this is equivalent to allowing users to differ arbitrarily on one element of their data. With this distance definition, we can then define the element-level sample distance by
Two samples S, S of size n are element-neighbors if each of the units within the sample is identical except for (at most) one unit x ∈ S, x ∈ S , where d user (x, x ) ≤ 1. The definition of element level privacy is now immediate: we take the sample distance d sample in any privacy definition (e.g. 2.1 or 2.2) to be d element .
Definition 2.3. A mechanism M satisfies element-level differential privacy or Rényi-differential privacy if it satisfies Definition 2.1 or 2.2, (respectively) with distance d sample = d element .
Element-level differential privacy guarantees that the releases of a mechanism trained on users' sensitive data does not leak any particular "element" the user has, that is, whether a user has data belonging to any one of the clusters c 1 , . . . , c K , no matter how many data point belong to one of the clusters. It is useful to compare this definition to two frequent definitions of privacy for large-scale learning systems. The first is event-level privacy [30] , which applies privacy commensurate with each individual event a user performs, for example, whenever a user visits any website. This definition may be too weak: consider a user who sends 50 text-messages consisting of the phrase "Hello!" Then event-level privacy (say with Def. 2.1) guarantees a likelihood ratio bound of e 50ε versus an otherwise identical user who never uses the phrase "Hello!" In the case of element-level privacy, however, the distance between these users is at most 1 regardless of how many times either says "Hello!" The second common definition is user-level privacy, which corresponds to the standard definitions with Hamming distance; by taking a single cluster c 1 = X in the definitions (2)-(3) of element level distances, one recovers user-level privacy, but as we shall see, the additional flexibility of element-level privacy allows more utility.
To get a feel for Definition 2.3, it is instructive to consider two (somewhat stylized) examples. Example 1 (Word frequency estimation): Consider the problem of estimating frequent words used in text (SMS) messages. Ignoring punctuation, we treat each word as a cluster, so that for a dictionary of size d, a user u's data
∈ N of the times user u typed word j, a histogram of word counts. In Figure 1 , for example, the leftmost column has histogram with count 3 for the word "yo," 3 for "bro," and 0 for all other words. The distance between two user data x, x is then d user (x, x ) = d j=1 1{x j = x j }, the number of distinct counts. In this case, two users are neighboring when their word use is identical except that one may use a word j arbitrarily more or less than the other. 3
Example 2 (Website visit counts):
Consider estimating the frequency of popular websites (URLs) that users visit. In this case, a natural set of elements are domains (the first part of a website name), while specific URLs belong to a single domain. For example, https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_Inc. and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NeXT belong to the domain (cluster) wikipedia.org, while http://web.stanford.edu/~jduchi/ and http://web. stanford.edu/~asi/ belong to stanford.edu. Then a user's data consists of all URLs he or she visits, while the distance between users is the number of domains in which they visit distinct URLs. The intuition here is that any mechanism satisfying Definition 2.3 limits release of whether a user ever even visits a website in a particular domain, for example, wikipedia.org, stanford.edu, or youtube.com. In contrast, standard differential privacy would protect whether a user has ever used the internet. 3
As these examples attempt to clarify, the important facet of element-level DP is that it protects a data provider from anyone ever knowing any particular thing they have done, regardless of how many times they have done it: visiting a domain, using a word, or other desired protected element.
Properties of element-level differential privacy
By replacing the standard Hamming distance in the different definitions of differential privacy with the element-based distance (3), any element-level differentially private mechanism inherits the typical properties private mechanisms enjoy, including privacy to post-processing, group privacy, composition, and amplification of privacy by (anonymous) subsampling (see the book [25] for a discussion of these desiderata). Almost all of these inheritances are immediate, but to give a flavor of these results we present several for the (ε, δ)-element-level differentially private case. Corollary 2.1 (Post-Processing). Let M : X n → Z be an (ε, δ)-element-level private mechanism. For any (potentially randomized) function on Z, the mechanism f •M is (ε, δ)-element-level private. Corollary 2.2 (Group Privacy). Let M : X n → Z be an (ε, δ)-element-level private mechanism. Let S = {x (u) } n u=1 and S = {x (u) } n u=1 ∈ X n be two samples. Then for any measurable set A, 
is (ε i , δ i )-element-level differentially private, meaning that for fixed z i−1 1 , M i (·, z i−1 1 ) is private. The k-fold composition M k • · · · • M 1 then has recursive definition Z i = M i (S, Z i−1 1 ). We have the following corollary (for the proof of differentially private version, see [25, Thm. 3.20 and Appendix B] and [19, Corollary 6.26] , and for the Rényi version, see [40, Prop. 1] ). 
We also obtain that subsampling amplifies the privacy of our mechanisms (see [7, Thms. 8 & 9] ). We consider the two most natural subsampling mechanisms. The first, which we denote Π q , takes a sample S and returns a subsample S ⊂ S where each element x (u) ∈ S is included with a fixed probability q ∈ (0, 1). The second, Π wo m , samples m elements without replacement from S.
Corollary 2.4 (Amplification by subsampling).
Let M be an (ε, δ)-element differentially private mechanism that acts on samples of arbitrary size. Then (i) For any q ∈ (0, 1), the subsampled mechanism M • Π q is (log(1 + q(e ε − 1)), qδ)-element-level differentially private.
(ii) For any m ≤ n ∈ N, the subsampled mechanism M • Π wo m applied to samples of size |S| = n is
Finally, we discuss amplification of Rényi element-level differential privacy by subsampling using a particular Gaussian mechanism that will form the basis for our stochastic approximation results in the sequel. In this case, we build off of Abadi et al.'s moments accountant [1] , whose primitive is to release a sum of vectors. Consider samples of the form
k corresponds to a desired statistics for element/cluster k and each individual vector satisfies x (u) k 2 ≤ ρ for some ρ < ∞. The goal is to release a sum of the entire sample, n u=1 K k=1 x (u) k , but instead we consider subsampling by users. In particular, for q ∈ [0, 1] and σ ≥ 0, let B u ∈ {0, 1} be either i.i.d. Bernoulli(q) or uniform on u B u = qn, let W ∼ N(0, I), and consider the mechanism
Taking d user (x, x ) as the user distance (2), we have the following corollary, with minor extension to handle the variants of subsampling (i.i.d. or fixed size without replacement).
Corollary 2.5 (Moments accountant, [1] Lemma 3)
. Let α ≥ 1 and P t be the N(t, σ 2 ) distribution. The mechanism (4) is (ε α , α)-element-level Rényi differentially private with
It is possible to numerically evaluate the Rényi divergences in the corollary, making them effective in applications, though they are unavailable analytically. As a consequence of the corollary, if we compose the mechanism (4) adaptively T times, composition for Rényi privacy immediately guarantees the entire mechanism is (T ε α (q, σ), α)-Rényi element-level private. As a consequence, recalling Mironov's transformation from Rényi to approximate differential privacy [40] , for any
To give a sense of the level of privacy maintained, we consider the bound of [1, Lemma 3]; a slight variant of its proof yields
δ . We remark in passing and without proof that each of the preceding corollaries has an analog in Dong et al.'s f -differential privacy [18] .
Element-level private methods
One of our major goals is to demonstrate the methodological possibilities of mechanisms satisfying element-level privacy, both to give some sense of the way to design mechanisms satisfying the definition and to understand the potential utility benefits-in terms of more accurate estimationelement-level privacy allows over user-level notions of privacy. To that end, we present three examples in this section of increasing sophistication: discovering most frequent elements or heavy hitters (Sec. 3.1), estimating multinomial frequencies (Sec. 3.2), and finally, stochastic optimization and statistical learning (Sec. 3.3).
We begin by attempting to give a somewhat general picture, connecting to the classical Laplace mechanisms and sensitivity analyses of Dwork et al. [28] ; we specialize in the coming sections. Suppose each user contributes a batch x = (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of data, and we wish to compute the average f (x (u) )+gs(f )·N 0,
In contrast, given a partition {c 1 , . . . , c K } of X and corresponding user distance d user (recall Eq. (2)), the analogous recipe here is to add noise scaling with the element sensitivity of f ,
which satisfies es(f ) ≤ gs(f ). Then the standard Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms become
Gaussian mechanism (6) and guarantee ε-or (ε, δ)-element-level differential privacy. We see utility gains whenever es(f ) gs(f ), which we expect when the number K of elements is large, providing finer granularity privacy.
Discovering heavy hitters
The first two examples we consider are to estimate properties of a multinomial. We consider a sampling scheme where each of n users generates a vector
+ is an unknown vector of probabilities, p T 1 = 1, and m ∈ N is the number of trials. The goal is to estimate different properties of the vector p, where X (u) j ∈ {0, . . . , m} indicates the count of appearances of item j for user u. For example, if these multinomials indicate purchases users make in a grocery store, we may be interested in the items the most users purchase. Bhaskar et al. [10] provide a sophisticated analysis of private algorithms for finding multisets of frequent items in item stream; we consider a much simpler scenario than theirs (we care only about individual items/elements, and wish to release an ordering of all elements rather than a top few, the latter adding significant complexity to the problem), as we treat this more as an illustrative example. While stylized, it is illustrative of the approaches possible with element-level privacy.
We assume that each item j ∈ {1, . . . , d} is an element, so that the user distance d user (x, x ) = d j=1 1{x j = x j }. Then we consider the mechanism
for some σ ≥ 0 to be chosen depending on the desired privacy. Following our discussion to begin Sec. 3, the element sensitivity (5) 
so the following is immediate by Definition 2.2 and the Gaussian mechanism (1).
Lemma 3.1. Let ε ≥ 0 and assume that each observation X (u) satisfies j X (u) j = m as above. The mechanism (7) provides the following privacy guarantees.
(i) Let α ≥ 1 and take σ 2 = α ε . Then M is (ε, α)-element level Rényi private.
(ii) Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and
In contrast to the element-level noise scaling above, the global sensitivity of the indicator vector
, so that noise addition mechanisms for standard differential privacy (e.g. the Gaussian mechanism (1)) add noise whose variance on each coordinate scales as
to achieve (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Rather than attempting to recover the actual frequencies of appearance, we consider a loss measuring the number of mis-ordered pairs of elements, an estimate suffers loss if it mis-orders a pair of indices (i, j) where p i ≥ p j + γ for some threshold γ. We assume w.l.o.g. that p 1 ≥ p 2 ≥ . . . ≥ p d , and define
We then have the following proposition, whose proof we provide in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. Assume that p 1 = max j p j ≤ 1 2m . Let 0 ≤ t ≤ d and H denote the mechanism (7) with Gaussian noise. Then L order ( H) ≤ t 2 whenever
We provide a bit of commentary on this result. First, we consider the scaling to achieve a fixed error L order ( H) ≤ t 2 , where the dominant terms are the second two in the maximum of Proposition 1. Let γ el denote the separation threshold at which we obtain small loss for elementlevel privacy and γ std that for the mechanism providing standard (ε, δ)-differential privacy (i.e. mechanism (7) with variance σ 2 std ). Then ignoring logarithmic factors, we require
Thus, in high dimensional situations where we expect that p 1 is small enough that p 1 m/n, the element-level private mechanism can provide substantially fewer ordering errors than a mechanism providing user-level privacy.
Histogram estimation
We now turn to the problem of estimating item frequencies-histogram estimation-one of the original motivations for differential privacy [28, Ex. 3] . We are in an identical setting to Sec. 3.1,
We elaborate this setting somewhat to allow more substantial elements, as in Example 2, by assuming there are K clusters {c 1 , . . . , c K } partitioning [d] . For shorthand, for v ∈ R d we let v c k = [v j ] j∈c k ∈ R |c k | , and we denote the probability of an item in c k by P (c k ) = 1 T p c k = j∈c k p j .
We consider a normal noise addition mechanism (6), but our first step is to design a function insensitive to changes within the partition {c 1 , . . . , c K } of [d], reducing the element sensitivity. To that end, we consider a mechanism that first projects each cluster c k of counts into an 2 -ball, then adds Gaussian noise. For v ∈ R d , we define the projection
(with the obvious re-ordering in the second equality). The mechanism is then
As with Lemma 3.1, we then immediately obtain the privacy of the mechanism (9). = m as above. The mechanism (9) provides the following privacy guarantees.
(i) Let α ≥ 1 and take σ 2 = α ε . Then M is (ε, α)-element-level Rényi private.
Then M is (ε, δ)-element-level differentially private. We now turn to an investigation of the error of the mechanism (9), providing the following proposition (whose proof we give in Appendix C). Proposition 2. Let m ≥ 3, t ≥ 0, and assume that for cluster probabilites P (c) = j∈c p j we have
If ρ ≥ m, the preceding inequalities hold with t = ∞.
Let us compare standard mechanism's errors with the element-level mechanism's errors, focusing on the squared error. For the user-level case, we have global sensitivity ρ = m, and the proposition shows that the mean-squared error for each coordinate scales as max{ mp j n , σ 2 m 2 n 2 }. For element-level privacy, if we take t = log n in the definition of ρ, we obtain mean-squared error scaling as
Thus, whenever the individual contribution sizes m are large while probabilities of elements P (c) are small, element-level mechanisms allow much more accurate estimation of frequencies than standard private noise addition. Of course, the best choice of the projection threshold ρ for element-level privacy requires some knowledge of the rough probabilities of each cluster, as otherwise, it is impossible to choose ρ appropriately; a two-stage estimator (to give rough upper bounds on the element probabilities P (c)) makes this feasible.
Statistical learning, risk minimization, and M-estimation
Our final application is a fairly careful investigation of statistical learning problems in the context of element-level differential privacy and realistic federated learning problems, where individuals contribute more than a single data point (e.g. because they send many text messages). The typical statistical learning or generic M-estimation problem [31, 49] is as follows: for a sample space X and parameter space Θ, we have a loss : Θ × X → R + , where (θ; x) measures the loss of a parameter θ on observation x, and we wish to minimize the average loss over a population P . In standard empirical risk minimization or M-estimation, one receives X (u) iid ∼ P , then chooses θ n to minimize the empirical average 1 n n u=1 (θ; X (u) ). In our context of element privacy, we modify this slightly. Individuals (users) contribute batches of data x ⊂ X , where the users are drawn from an underlying population P . Recalling Section 2.2, we assume that there is a prespecified partition {c 1 , . . . , c K } of X , so that the element of protection is whether a user with data x = {x 1 , . . . , x m } has any individual datum x i ∈ c k . Then the elementlevel loss for a data batch x ∈ 2 X averages losses within each element,
that is, the sum of average losses in the non-empty elements in x. The idea of the averaging (10) is to make the loss insensitive to modification of data belonging to any single c k . For an underlying population distribution P , we then wish to solve the risk minimization problem
Given a sample S = {X (u) } n u=1 ∼ P , we approximate the risk (11) with
which we attempt to minimize as a proxy for (11) . To describe our algorithms and their properties, however, we require a brief digression to provide a general analysis of stochastic approximation procedures under noise, giving an asymptotic convergence result that may be interesting independent of its privacy implications.
A digression to general stochastic optimization
Consider a generic population risk minimization problem
where : Θ × X → R is a loss. We have a sample of size n from the population P , and we instead consider applying a stochastic approximation algorithm on the empirical risk
for X i iid ∼ P . We consider stochastic projected gradient methods for the problem (13) . In our proofs in Appendix D, we generalize this to Asi and Duchi's general aProx (approximate proximal point) family [5] , though its full treatment somewhat obscures the privacy issues at hand.
In standard applications of stochastic gradient methods [45, 44, 41] to the population risk problem (12) , one receives an i.i.d. sequence X k and updates
where proj Θ (v) = argmin θ∈Θ { θ − v 2 } denotes the Euclidean projection onto Θ. We consider a variant of the projected stochastic gradient method as it applies to triangular arrays, letting the sample size n vary in the stochastic gradient update applied to the empirical risk (13) . Focusing on the case when the losses are smooth and convex, we show that as the number of iterations and the sample size jointly increase, the projected stochastic gradient method on the empirical risk (13) gives asymptotically normal iterates. To that end, consider problems indexed by sample size n, with a triangular array of samples S n := {X n i } n i=1 for X n i iid ∼ P . Let σ n ≥ 0 be a fixed variance, and let Z i be an i.i.d. sequence of random vectors with E[Z i ] = 0 and Cov(Z i ) = Σ z . (We allow σ n > 0 because we will use the coming iteration in a private setting, where noise is essential.) For each k ∈ N, let ri(k) be an index chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , n}, and for k = 1, 2, . . . , and n ∈ N, consider the noisy stochastic projected gradient iteration
Under a few simplifying assumptions on the problem (12) reminiscent of the typical classical conditions for M-estimation [49, Ch. 5.3] , we can prove that the iterates θ n k enjoy asymptotic optimality properties as n, k → ∞.
Assumption A1. The domain Θ ⊂ R d is compact convex, and there exists L 0 : X → R + such that (·; x) is L 0 (x)-Lipschitz over Θ. The minimizer θ := argmin θ∈Θ L(θ) is unique with θ ∈ int Θ, and L is C 2 in a neighborhood of θ , with ∇ 2 L(θ ) 0. In addition, there exists an > 0 and L 1 , L 2 : X → R + such that (·; x) has L 1 (x)-Lipschitz gradient and L 2 (x)-Lipschitz Hessian on the
In the projected stochastic gradient iteration (14), we assume that we run the algorithm (on random subsamples) for k = k(n) iterations, where the total k depends on the sample size. We usually expect that k = γn for some γ ≥ 1, though in some cases we may wish to take k/n → ∞. We also (typically) assume the variance σ n , which we add for privacy, is decreasing.
We have the following theorem, whose proof we provide in Appendix D.
θ n i and assume that α k = α 0 k −β for some β ∈ ( 1 2 , 1). Define Σ = Cov(∇ (θ ; X)) and Σ z = Cov(Z). Assume that the iteration count k = k(n) satisfies lim n→∞ k(n) n = γ > 0, and that lim n→∞ σ n = σ ≥ 0. Then as n → ∞,
We provide a bit of commentary. First, the optimal covariance possible (by the local asymptotic minimax theorem for stochastic optimization [22] ) for any estimator of θ given n observations is
n is large, we have limited asymptotic efficiency loss; moreover, if the limiting variance σ 2 n → σ 2 is zero, then the efficiency loss is precisely the factor 1 + 1/γ. In our privacy application, there is a tradeoff between k, the number of iterations, and the scale σ n of the necessary noise given a sample of size n.
A private stochastic gradient method
We now turn to the appropriate variant of the projected gradient method (14) for privacy. The key from an element-level privacy perspective is to apply a projected gradient update on each of a user's elements, then average them together. Algorithm 1 captures this.
Algorithm 1 Element-level projected gradient update sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , x)
Require: Projection parameter ρ, stepsize α, initial model θ 0 , partition of X into C = {c 1 , . . . , c K }, and user data
Because Algorithm 1 divides its updates into the clusters c k before computing projections (clipping them to a particular radius) and updates, its combination with appropriate noise immediately yields several privacy properties. The most important result for us is to apply Alg. 1 in a stochastic-gradient-type scheme, which allows us to both leverage the moments-accountant (recall Corollary 2.5) and convergence guarantees of stochastic gradient-type methods. Following the subsampling (4), for q ∈ (0, 1) let B u iid ∼ Bernoulli(q) or B u be uniform on u B u = qn, and for a sample S = {x (u) } n u=1 define the subsampled mechanism
For any sequence of stepsizes, we may define the private stochastic approximation method
We consider the privacy of the iteration (15) both in the standard (user-level) private scenario and under element-level privacy. It is immediate that the update sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , ·) in Alg. 1 has element sensitivity at most 2ρ, where neighboring data x, x guarantee sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , x) − sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , x ) 2 ≤ 2ρ. For standard privacy, we consider the global sensitivity of the update: assuming the upper bound card(x) ≤ M on the cardinality of user data, we have sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , x) − sgd-el α,ρ (θ 0 , x ) 2 ≤ 2(K ∧ M )ρ for any two sets x, x ⊂ X . We immediately obtain the following two corollaries on the privacy of the private stochastic gradient update (15) . Pursuing the discussion following Corollary 2.5, let us assume we subsample a constant fraction q = m/n of the data in the iteration (15) , where m is fixed and does not grow with n. Then for 0 < δ < 1, the entire collection θ 1:
Applications of element-level private stochastic approximation
While the updates (15) provide privacy no matter the loss, their utility comes in conjunction with our analysis in Theorem 1. To that end, we now provide a generic convergence result with a brief application to generalized linear model estimation; our coming experiments evidence the utility of our definitions and mechanisms. We first recall the element-level population risk (11) , which averages a standard loss into the element-level loss el . We make a few additional assumptions on the standard loss over our data X parallelling Assumption A1.
Assumption A2. There exists L 0 < ∞ such that θ → (θ; x) is L 0 -Lipschitz over Θ for each x ∈ X . The minimizer θ := argmin θ∈Θ L el (θ) is unique with θ ∈ int Θ, and L el is C 2 on an -neighborhood of θ with ∇ 2 L el (θ ) 0. There are L 1 , L 2 : X → R + such that (·; x) has L 1 (x)-Lipschitz gradient and L 2 (x)-Lipschitz Hessian on θ
The key consequence of the first Lipschitz condition in Assumption A2 is that no projection is necessary in Alg. 1 to guarantee that sgd-el α,ρ (θ, ·) has bounded element sensitivity, so that the private iteration (15) is an instance of the stochastic approximation iteration (14) . Indeed, the Lipschitz condition is equivalent to ∂ (θ; x) 2 ≤ L 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, and in turn, the definition (14) guarantees that g n k 2 ≤ ∇ (θ n k ; X n ri(k) ) 2 ≤ L 0 (cf. [21] ). As a consequence, the element-level update of Algorithm 1 performs no projection in the definition [∆ k ] ρ whenever ρ ≥ L 0 . Now, recall the asymptotic normality result of Theorem 1. For each n we let {X (u) } n u=1 iid ∼ P and θ n i be generated by the iteration (15) for the given sample {X (u) } n u=1 and assume the projection level ρ ≥ L 0 . Let the stepsizes α k = α 0 k −β for some β ∈ ( 1 2 , 1) and subsampling rate q = m/n for a fixed m. Combining Theorem 1 with Corollaries 3.1 and 3.2 and the discussion immediately following (16), we have the following proposition, which shows that the private stochastic iteration guarantees both asymptotic normality, and privacy. 
(ii) Assume that each user data x has cardinality at most card(
As in the preceding examples, we see roughly the same tradeoffs between user-level (standard) and element-level privacy: for a given level ε, it is possible to provide the less-stringent element-level privacy with noise a factor K ∧ M less than that for user-level privacy.
In general, the partitioning that the element-level loss (10) and risk (11) in the data space may change the resulting estimated parameters from more standard sampling schemes. However, any normalization of user's data (as some users contribute many data points, some contribute few) in any application engenders changes in the "optimal" parameter θ , so we believe this of limited impact. To give a somewhat concrete example, consider generalized linear models (GLMs) [36] : Example 3 (Generalized linear models): In a GLM, for an individual data point x ∈ R d we have Y with density (or p.m.f.)
where h is a base measure, A(θ; x) is the log-partition function A(θ; x) = log e T (y)θ T x h(y)dy, and T the sufficient statistic. In this case for loss (θ; x, y) = − log p θ (y | x), any partition of X into elements guarantees that θ = argmin θ L el (θ) remains fixed. The Fisher information may change, of course: given a partition of X into clusters {c k } K k=1 , defining p k = P(X (u) ∩ c k = ∅), we have L el (θ) = K k=1 p k E[ (θ; X, Y ) | X ∈ c k ], so that modifying the partition c k changes ∇ 2 L el (θ ) and Σ el ; in some situations, this can decrease the asymptotic variance, while in others, it may increase, depending on the degree of stratification and relative probabilities. 3 
Experiments
To demonstrate the behavior of element-level private mechanisms, we present a series of experimental results in crowdsourced (federated) learning and stochastic optimization. We perform both simulations, where we may control all aspects of the experiments, and real-world experiments. Our theoretical results and intuition suggest that as the number of elements we consider grows-meaning that the elements provide a finer partition of the input space X -we should observe performance improvements. In large-scale estimation, such as federated learning [37] , user data is rarely i.i.d. For example, some users take many photos of their children, others of dogs, others of hikes with friends; thus, a user may provide data only relating to a few elements. Motivated by this potential variability, for datasets with no pre-existing users, we diversify our experiments by constructing pseudo-users and assigning them varying numbers of elements.
In the remainder of the section, we present results for histogram estimation (Sec. 4.1), a simulated logistic regression experiment (Sec. 4.2), and then two experiments on fitting large image classification models, the first on tuning a model to a new dataset based on Flickr images (Sec. 4.3), and the second an investigation on training a full neural network (Sec. 4.4 ). An essential part of each experiment is to describe how we choose the elements to protect-this decision is more of a policy decision than a purely mathematical one, and consequently deserves care and thought, especially in real-world applications. In each experiment, we provide user-level or element-level (ε, δ)-differential privacy, where δ = n −1.1 , where n is the total number of users.
Histogram estimation
We consider the problem of estimating frequent words on a dataset consisting of Reddit comments [9] , where unique usernames identify users. Proposition 2 predicts that element-level privacy with appropriate parameter settings in the mechanism (9) should reduce squared error by a factor of roughly max c∈{c k } P (c) 2 , so that increasing cluster counts should yield further improvements.
In the experiment, we consider the first n = 2000 users with the largest number of tokens (words), using as our dictionary those words in the vocabulary of GloVe (Global Vectors for Word Representation) [43] , yielding dictionary of size d = 400000, where we choose a random subsample of each user's words to obtain m = 4000 words per individual. Additionally, we remove the 100 most frequent stopwords (e.g. "the", "and", "a"). GloVe embeds words into R 100 , and using these embedded vectors, we cluster the d = 4 · 10 5 -sized vocabulary into K = 10, 100, 1000, 10000, and 400000 clusters (elements); assuming the embedding is "semantically meaningful" as claimed [43] , these elements should naturally demarcate themes and conversation foci. Within each experiment, we calculate the histogram to be estimated by first randomly dividing users into two disjoint sets S 0 and S 1 and defining the "true" histogram H 0 = 1 m|S 0 | u∈S 0 X (u) . We then estimate H 0 using the sample S 1 via the mechanism (9), H = 1 m M(S 1 , ρ, {c k }). In each individual experiment-that is, for each choice of privacy level ε and total number of clusters-we use a validation set to choose the truncation threshold ρ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} ∪ {15, 20, . . . , 50} ∪ {70, 100, 150, 200} minimizing the mean-squared error, so that our results reflect the best behavior for each method.
We estimate the baseline mean squared error to be H 0 − H 1 2 2 . In Figure 2 , we plot the ratio H − H 0 2 2 / H 1 − H 0 2 2 of squared error for the private estimation algorithm over the baseline mean squared error against the privacy parameter ε. The results broadly are as expected: increasingly fine partitions yield better estimators. Moreover, for a given privacy level ε, the separation between the mean-squared error is roughly linear on a logarithmic scale, which is what we expect from reductions scaling as max c∈{c k } P (c) 2 . 
Simulated logistic regression
The remainder of our experiments consider M-estimation and statistical risk minimization, as in Section 3.3. We begin with a simulation study to more precisely control the hypotheses and experiments, focusing on logistic regression. For each experiment, we generate data via the following hierarchical model: first, we draw K = 10 element centers c 1 , . . . , c K iid ∼ Uni(S d−1 ) and θ ∼ Uni(S d−1 ). Then we generate pairs (X i , Y i ) ∈ R d × {±1} according to the logistic model
so each datum X i belongs to the cluster around element C i . Following the model that users provide several data points, we generate data for n = 1000 users, each consisting of m = 50 pairs (x i , y i ). Given a collection of users, we apply the private stochastic gradient method (15) with the element-level update sgd-el α,ρ (θ, (x, y)) of Alg. 1. We vary the diversity of data users provide, so that in different experiments users provide data from k = 2, 5, 8 of the K = 10 clusters; we expect that the more diverse the data the users provide (i.e. coverage of clusters), the more element-level privacy should improve over standard (user-level) private mechanisms.
We calculate the privacy parameter ε for both user-and element-level privacy using Abadi et al. maximize a method's performance, so for each fixed privacy level ε, we (experimentally) find a subsampling rate q and initial stepsize α 0 to yield the best performance for each method.
We show results in Figure 3 , where we plot the error θ − θ 2 for the final estimated θ of the private stochastic gradient iteration against the provided privacy level ε. Broadly, the results are as expected: as we increase the diversity of elements for which each user has data, the estimation error decreases for a given element privacy level ε, while user-level private mechanisms exhibit little change on this axis. Of note, however, is the baseline error: the more clusters (i.e. more stratified the data per user), the better a non-private stochastic gradient scheme estimates θ . We believe this occurs because the stratification of data within users improves problem conditioning. Even with this difference, however, the convergence of the error of the private stochastic gradient method to that of the non-private error is faster for scenarios with more clusters.
Large-scale multiclass image classification: the Flickr dataset
Following our simulated logistic regression results, we investigate element-level privacy in the context of model fitting for a large image classification task, following our methodology in Section 3.3. In this experiment, we vary several parameters: the privacy level ε ∈ {1, 3, ∞}, the number of distinct clusters into which we partition the input space (K = 50, 500), and, as we discuss in the introduction to the experiments, we also vary the diversity of images of individual users, so that we provide nominal "users" with data from 5, 30, or 100 distinct clusters/elements. As in the previous experiments, we expect the following: as the number of clusters K increases, element-level private methods should improve relative to the user-level private method, and similarly, as the diversity of individual users' images increases (the number of distinct elements), we expect to see further relative improvement. This is natural: in Algorithm 1 and the update (15) , the magnitude of noise addition relative to the scale of a user's contribution decreases linearly in the number of distinct elements a user provides.
To this end, we perform a model tuning experiment on the Flickr dataset [48] using a ResNet50 network [32] pre-trained on ImageNet [17] , with reference implementation [42] . This tuning means we fit only the last layer of the network, that is, we fit a multiclass logistic regression on input features x ∈ R d , d = 2048, defined by the outputs of the second-to-last ResNet50 layer. We use the 100 most popular Flickr image tags as labels, which represent 89% of the chosen data, and used an "unknown" label for anything remaining, resulting in a 101 class multiclass problem. To construct the elements into which we partition the images, we chose a uniformly random subset of 100,000 Flickr images, then used KMeans++ [4] to cluster them into K = 50 and 500 clusters. Then a given image representation x simply belongs to the nearest cluster centroid. To fit the resulting model, we use the stochastic gradient method in Algorithm 1 as applied in the update (15) . We construct a nominal collection of n = 8000 users, assigning each m = 100 labeled images (x, y). We vary the image allocations, so that (depending on the experiment) each user has images from on average k = 5, 30, 100 distinct elements. We perform T = 40,000 updates (15) in each experiment.
We present results in Figure 4 , plotting the maximum top-5 accuracy achieved (i.e. there is no loss if the correct label belongs to the five highest-scoring predicted labels for an example x) versus iteration for many parameter settings. In the figure, we simultaneously present results for different privacy levels ε, number K of clusters, and diversity of clusters per user. We highlight a few of the most salient points. First, user-level privacy with ε = 1 is substantially worse than any other method. Second, we see roughly what we expect, in that the element-level private algorithms achieve higher accuracy as the number of clusters and per-user diversity increase. Given that true internet-scale datasets are several times larger than the 400,000 image dataset we construct, this suggests the element-level private mechanisms can provide strong utility with satisfactory privacy.
Fully training a neural network: image classification on CIFAR10
We present our final experimental results for a classification problem on the CIFAR10 dataset [35] , showing that it is possible to privately train a neural network while providing element-level privacy. We use the relatively simple convolutional neural network model architecture in the PyTorch tutorial [42] . To construct the cluster centroids (elements), we mimic the method we propose for Flickr: we upsample the CIFAR image (using PyTorch), pass the resulting image through the pre-trained ResNet50 network above, and then cluster the resulting 2048-dimensional vectors using KMeans++ [4] to construct K = 100 centroids that partition the CIFAR dataset.
We again perform a federated learning experiment over T = 40,000 steps (Alg. 1 and update (15) ). Similar to our experiment with Flickr-except that we train a full neural network-we considered n ∈ {2, 8} · 10 3 users, each assigned m = 100 images from k = 5 or 30 of the K = 100 elements we cluster. Users may have repeat data. In Figure 5 , we plot the difference in top-1 accuracy between a private method and the fully-trained (non-private) tutorial convolutional neural network [42] against iteration, varying the privacy parameter ε and cluster diversity. As expected, we see two effects: first, as the sample size n grows, the accuracy improves; second, as the diversity of elements per user decreases, performance degrades as expected. All user-level private instantiations have accuracy more at least 15%-worse than the non-private accuracy. Conversely, the element-level-private algorithm with ε = 3, n = 8000, and high element diversity per-user ( data clusters present) achieves top-1 accuracy nearly equal to non-private training.
Discussion
We conclude with a brief discussion. Element-level differential privacy allows one to choose the granularity at which to provide privacy protections. As we see both in the theoretical results and experiments, this can allow substantially improved utility over standard private algorithms. This additional flexibility, however, comes with a challenge: one must carefully choose the elements (partition of the data space X ) to provide sufficient privacy, as increasing the number of clusters allows improved statistical accuracy while decreasing the number improves privacy. This apparent tradeoff requires a per-application policy decision, where one balances privacy-in the coarseness of the partitioning into elements-against utility; as in standard privacy, where the choice of ε is a policy decision that must trade privacy against utility, care is likely necessary here. A Sufficiency of mechanism (1)
The Rényi divergence between Gaussian distributions
. Thus for any mechanism defined by M(S) = f (S) + N(0, ρ 2 σ 2 ), we have D α (M(S)||M(S )) ≤ α 2σ 2 , so that Mironov's results [40] guarantee the mechanism is ( α 2σ 2 + log(1/δ) α−1 , δ)-differentially private. Setting α = 1 + 2 log(1/δ) ε and σ 2 = (1 + 2ε −1 log 1 δ )/ε gives the result.
B Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by presenting two lemmas that give us the tools to prove the proposition.
Proof The first and second claims are immediate. For the third, we have E[Y j Y l ] = P(X j > 0, X l > 0) = 1 − P(X j = 0, X l = 0) − P(X j > 0, X l = 0) − P(X j = 0, X l > 0).
As X j | (X l = 0) ∼ Binomial(m, p j 1−p l ), we have P(X j > 0, X l = 0) = P(X j > 0 | X l = 0)P(X l = 0)
and we similarly obtain that P(X j = 0, X l = 0) = 1 − q lj . Algebraic manipulations then give
as desired. Next, we prove the upper-bound on the probability that the private mechanism H mis-orders the two bins i and j > i.
See Section B.1 for a proof. By a binomial expansion, we see that if p i + p j ≤ 1 m , then
where the second inequality used the variance bound v ij ≤ q i + q j ≤ 3mp i of Lemma B.1. Setting γ as in the statement of the proposition and summing over all i < j in the loss L order of Eq. (8) gives the result.
B.1 Proof of Lemma B.2
Let i < j so that q i ≥ q j , as p i ≥ p j by assumption. Define the zero-mean random variable ∆
Using that |∆ Optimizing by setting λ = min{ 1 4 ,
Substituting t = n(q i − q j ) gives the lemma.
C Proof of Proposition 2
For shorthand, let p(ρ) = 1 n n u=1 π ρ,{c k } (X (u) ) be the non-privatized projection vector. We compute the bias and bounds on the moment generating function of each coordinate of the vector.
Bias of the projected vector
We control the bias for each element cluster. Fix c ∈ {c 1 , . . . , c k }.
To bound the remaining term in inequality (17), we present two lemmas, whose proofs we defer to Sections C.1 and C.2, respectively. 
The variable Y ∼ Binomial(m, P (c k )) in expression (17) , and
where inequality (i) is a consequence of Lemma C.1 and (ii) of Lemma C.2 once we recall that ρ ≥ 3mp + 4 log m + t.
Variance and moment generating function We have Var(π ρ,{c k } (X) j ) ≤ Var(X j ) = mp j (1 − p j ), because projections reduce variance. We also have π ρ,{c k } (X) j ≤ ρ, so as a consequence, we obtain the moment generating function bound
where we have used that 1 + x ≤ e x . Thus for any coordinate j we have
for all |λ| ≤ ρ −1 . Using the bias bound (18), we see that there exists a q ∈ R + with 1 T q c ≤ P (c) for each cluster c ∈ {c k } such that for any cluster c, j ∈ c, and u ≥ 0 we have
Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 1 (see specifically Appendix B.1), we thus obtain that for a numerical constant C > 0 and all u ≥ 0,
The variance bounds are immediate by noting that no (non-private) estimator has mean-squared error asymptotically better than
C.1 Proof of Lemma C.1
For j ≥ 3mp we have
By quasi-convexity of the ratio function, the last inequality implies that P(X ≥ j +1)/P(X ≥ j) ≤ 1 2 for j ≥ 3mp. The first inequality of the lemma now follows as ∞ i=0 2 −i = 2. The second inequality then follows as P(X ≥ l) = ∞ i=l P(X = i) ≤ P(X = l) ∞ i=0 2 −i .
C.2 Proof of Lemma C.2
Inequality (19) in the proof of Lemma C.1 gives P(X=j+1) P(X=j) ≤ 1/2 for j ≥ 3mp. We consider two cases according to the value of p. First, if p ≤ 1/m 2 , we have mp < 1 and so
where inequality (i) uses that 3 log m > 2 log m + 1 and inequality (ii) that 2 log m > 2, in both cases as m ≥ 3. In the other case, we let p ≥ 1/m 2 . Then
where inequality (iii) uses that P(X = k) ≤ P(X = k − 1) for k ≥ mp and again that 3 log m > 2 log m + 1.
D Proof of Theorem 1
We prove the theorem for a more general family of updates, which include projected stochastic gradient as a special case, known as the aProx (approximate proximal point) family [5, 6] ; several authors present convergence analyses for these methods [21, 15, 6, 5] . These methods iteratively build a model of the loss at the current iterate and minimize the model with regularization. A model of at a point θ 0 , denoted θ 0 (·; x), is a function satisfying the following conditions [15, 5] .
(C.i) The model θ → θ 0 (θ; x) is convex and subdifferentiable.
(C.ii) The model is locally accuate at θ 0 : θ 0 (θ 0 ; x) = (θ 0 ; x).
(C.iii) The model provides a lower bound: θ 0 (θ; x) ≤ (θ; x) for θ ∈ Θ.
When the losses are convex and differentiable, the simplest model is the linear (first-order) approximation θ 0 ( ; x) := (θ 0 ; x) + ∇ (θ 0 ; x), θ − θ 0 , which satisfies conditions (C.i)-(C.iii).
For an initial point θ 0 and stepsize α > 0, we define the approximate proximal point update
and gradient mapping
In standard application of such methods [21, 15, 5, 6] , given a datapoint x and stepsize α k , we update θ k+1 = aprox α k (θ k ; x) = θ k − α k g α k (θ k ; x). This recovers the standard projected gradient method whenever θ is the first-order model θ 0 (θ; x) = (θ 0 ; x) + ∇ (θ 0 ; x), θ − θ 0 We then perform the obvious generalization of the noisy stochastic gradient iteration (14) , and we will prove the convergence guarantee claimed in the theorem for the iteration θ n k+1 := θ n k − α k g α k (θ n k ; X n ri(k) ) + σ n Z k .
We develop a few notational shorthands for the analysis. Let θ n := argmin θ∈Θ L n (θ) and H n := ∇ 2 L n ( θ n ) = 1 n n i=1 ∇ 2 ( θ n ; X i ).
Then under the conditions of Assumption A1, standard asymptotics [49] give that θ n a.s.
Moreover, under Assumption A1, there exists λ > 0 such if we define the event
there exists a (potentially random, but finite N ) such that n ≥ N implies E n holds.
The sequence θ n k defines a triangular array, which adds some complexity to our proof and necessitates a somewhat more careful treatment, which we now provide. Our analysis follows Polyak and Juditsky [44] and Asi and Duchi [6] . We begin by defining the triply-indexed matrices
where we note that H −1 n exists on E n and satisfies H −1 n λ −1 I. Now, for sample size n, which corresponds to running algorithm (20) at the given sample size with sample {X 1 , . . . , X n }, we define n k (θ) = (θ; X n ri(k) ), that is, the loss encountered in iteration k of the algorithm with sample size n, where ri(k) is the random index in [n] chosen at iteration k. We let F n = σ(X 1 , . . . , X n ) denote the σ-field of the n observations, and F n k be the σ-field generated by X n 1 and the first k random indices ri(1), . . . , ri(k). Now we follow Asi and Duchi [6] . Let us implicitly assume the event E n holds, so that all derivatives are defined (by Assumption A1). Define the remainder R n (θ) := ∇L n (θ) − H n (θ − θ n ) and the localized (sub)gradient errors
Finally, we consider the model subgradient errors, where we note that θ n k+1 satisfies
where N Θ (θ) = {v ∈ R d | v, τ − θ ≤ 0, all τ ∈ Θ} denotes the normal cone to Θ at the point θ.
Thus, there is some vector v n k+1 ∈ N Θ (θ n k+1 ) such that
where v n k+1 = 0 if θ n k+1 ∈ int Θ. If θ n k+1 ∈ int Θ, then [6, Lemma A.5] guarantees that v n k+1 2 ≤ 2L 0 (X n ri(k) ) regardless. With this, we define the model subgradient errors ε n k := ∇ θ n k (θ n k+1 ; X n ri(k) ) + v n k+1 − ∇ (θ n k ; X n ri(k) ). With these substitutions, we have [6, Eq. (13) ] that
. Then following Polyak and Juditsky [44] and Asi and Duchi [6] (see Eq. (14) of the paper [6] , with a fixed negative sign), we have on the event E n that
where the O(1/ √ k) term is non-random on E n . Moreover, sup i,k,n 1{E n }|||B k i (n)||| op < ∞ as well [6, 44, Lemma 2] , and independent of n, there exists > 0 such that for all k ≥ K( ), 1 {E n } 1 k k i=1 |||A k i (n)||| op ≤ . We control each of these quantities in turn.
Lemma D.1. Define δ k,n := θ n k − θ n 2 1 {E n }. Then E[δ 2 k+1,n | F n ] ≤ (1 − c 0 α k )δ 2 k,n + α 2 k E[L 0 (X) 2 ]
for a constant c 0 > 0 that depends only on λ > 0 in the definition of E n and Θ. Additionally, for some C < ∞ independent of n and k, we have E[δ 2 k,n | F n ] ≤ Cα k log k. Lemma D.5. Let Assumption A1 hold and lim n σ n = σ ∈ [0, ∞). If k(n) → ∞ as n → ∞, then
where c 0 > 0 is a constant depending on λ, Θ, which is positive because ∇ 2 L n (θ) λI for θ near θ . In particular, with the definition δ k,n := θ n k − θ n 2 1 {E n }, then integrating over the indices ri(k) gives the result (24) .
The second result follows exactly as in the proof of Lemma A.2 of the paper [6] (see specifically inequality (17) in the arXiv technical report version).
D.2 Proof of Lemma D.2
On the event E n , L n has 2E[L 1 (X) 2 ]-Lipschitz gradient on Θ, and so a Taylor approximation gives that for some C < ∞ independent of n and k, R n (θ) ≤ C θ − θ n 2 2 . Thus
where we have used Lemma D.1. Thus
as k ↑ ∞. As E n happens eventually, we have the result.
D.3 Proof of Lemma D.3
Fixing the sample {X i } n i=1 , the localized subgradient errors ζ n k are a martingale sequence adapted to F n k = σ(F n , ri(1), . . . , ri(k)), the σ-field of F n and the random indices of the iteration through time k. Moreover, E n ∈ F n and B k i (n) ∈ F n for all i, k. Thus Now, we note that if θ n k , θ n ∈ θ + B, then ζ n k 2 ≤ L 1 (X n ri(k) ) + 1 n n i=1 L 1 (X i ) θ n k − θ n 2 , while otherwise we have ζ n k 2 ≤ 2L 0 (X n ri(k) ) + 2 n n i=1 L 0 (X i ).
In either case, on the event E n , the compactness of Θ guarantees that there exists some C < ∞ independent of n and k such that 1 {E n } ζ n k 2 ≤ C · 1 {E n } L 0 (X n ri(k) ) + L 1 (X n ri(k) ) + E[L 1 (X) 2 ] 1/2 θ n k − θ n 2 .
In particular, as θ n k ∈ F n k−1 , we obtain that 1 {E n } E ζ n k 2 2 | F n k−1 ≤ C · 1 {E n } E[L 0 (X) 2 ] + E[L 1 (X) 2 ] · θ n k − θ n 2 2 .
As sup i,k,n 1 {E n } B k i (n) op < ∞, we have
where the final inequality uses Lemma D.1. Dividing by k gives the result.
D.4 Proof of Lemma D.4
We continue to build off of Asi and Duchi [6] . By Lemma A.4 (a specialization of [16, Thm. 6.1]) of their paper, as (·; x) has L 1 (x)-Lipschitz gradient on θ + B ⊂ int Θ, we have (see also [6, Eq. (15) ]) that whenever θ n k , θ n k+1 ∈ θ + ( /4)B, ε n k 2 ≤ 2L 1 (X n ri(k) ) θ n k − θ n k+1 2 ≤ α k L 1 (X n ri(k) ) 2 + α k ∇ n k (θ n k ) 2 2 . We also always have ε n k 2 ≤ 4L 0 (X n ri(k) ) by the triangle inequality applied to the containment (22) . Consequently, we obtain that
Now, we use the triangle inequality to see that on the event E n , as θ n − θ 2 ≤ /8, to have θ n i+1 − θ 2 ≥ /4 we must have θ n i+1 − θ n 2 ≥ /8. Moreover, for this to be the case, the Lipschitz continuity of over Θ and that θ n i+1 − θ n i 2 ≤ α i L 0 (X n ri(i) ) together give that θ n i+1 − θ 2 ≥ 4 implies θ n i − θ n 2 + α i L 0 (X n ri(i) ) ≥ 8 .
Thus, revisiting the previous display, we have on E n that
2 · 1 θ n i − θ n 2 ≥ /16 + 1 α i L 0 (X n ri(i) ) ≥ /8 L 0 (X n ri(i) )
Taking expectations conditional on F n and using that E n ∈ F n , we have on the event E n that
E L 0 (X n ri(i) )1 θ n i − θ n 2 ≥ /16 | F n + 4 √ k k i=1 1 n n j=1 L 0 (X j )1 {α i L 0 (X j ) ≥ /8}
where we have used that on E n , 1 n n i=1 L a (X i ) 2 ≤ 2E[L a (X) 2 ] for a ∈ {0, 1, 2}. We now control the first terms in the righthand sum of inequality (28) . For the second, we note that if Y is a random variable with E[Y 2 ] ≤ C, then
by the Cauchy-Schwarz and Chebyshev inequalities, so that on event E n that 1 n n i=1 L 0 (X i ) 2 ≤ 2E[L 0 (X) 2 ], we have 1 n n j=1 L 0 (X j )1 {α i L 0 (X j ) ≥ /8} ≤ 16 α i .
For the first term in the right side of (28), recalling the definition δ k,n = θ n k − θ n 2 1{E n } in Lemma D.1, we use that θ n i ∈ F n i−1 to obtain 1 {E n } E L 0 (X n ri(i) )1 θ n − θ n i 2 ≥ /16 | F n = 1 n n j=1 L 0 (X j )P (δ i,n ≥ /16 | F n )
where the inequality is a consequence of Lemma D.1 and Chebyshev's inequality. Returning to inequality (28), we find that
where C < ∞ may depend on problem parameters (e.g. and E[L a (X) 2 ]) but is independent of k and n. As k i=1 α i log i/ √ k = O(1)k 1−β−1/2+ for any > 0, and E n occurs with probability one eventually, taking expectations over F n gives the lemma.
D.5 Proof of Lemma D.5
Recall that on E n , if k = k(n) → ∞ then 1 k k i=1 |||A k i (n)||| op → 0. As conditional on F n we have E[∇ n i ( θ n ) | F n ] = 1 n n i=1 ∇ ( θ n ; X i ) = 0 on E n , and the Z i are mean-zero independent of F n with Cov(Z i ) = Σ z , we have
A k i (n)∇ ( θ n ; X j )
as k → ∞, because sup i,k,n |||A k i (n)||| op 1{E n } < ∞. That E n occurs eventually gives the lemma.
